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INTRODUCTION
Among the characters that occupy the modern legal landscape,
the professional plaintiff is one of the most despised. Such plaintiffs
are, in the words of one judge, “rapacious jackals whose declared
concern for the corporate well-being camouflages their unwhole-
some appetite for corporate dollars.”1 They have been denigrated as
“bounty hunters”2 and cast as the punchline in at least one joke.3
But despite decades of abuse lobbed at them by the press4 and
members of Congress,5 professional plaintiffs continue to inhabit
the realm of civil litigation. Perhaps their longevity stems from a
characteristic that Judge Easterbrook identified in Murray v. GMAC
Mortgage Corp.6 In refusing to affirm the denial of class treatment
to a family bringing more than fifty lawsuits under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, Easterbrook stated that “the district judge did not
explain ... why ‘professional’ is a dirty word. It implies experience,
if not expertise.”7
Thus, from a different perspective, the professional plaintiff is
more akin to a misunderstood hero—the battle-tested “private
attorney general” who shoulders the burden of enforcing regulatory
violations for the good of society.8
1. Anthony Borden, The Shareholder Suit Charade, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 68 (quoting
Brown v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 96 F.R.D. 64, 67 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
2. See Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive
Payments to Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 414 (2006).
3. See Thomas W. Antonucci, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the States:
Who Will Decide the Future of Securities Litigation?, 46 EMORY L.J. 1237, 1242 n.32 (1997)
(noting that a floor debate in the Senate referred to professional securities plaintiffs as “the
world’s unluckiest investors” (quoting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32-33 (1995) (Conf. Rep.))).
4. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Millions for Us, Pennies for You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993,
at C1; Timothy L. O’Brien & Jonathan D. Glater, Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods?, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2005, at B1.
5. Antonucci, supra note 3, at 1242 n.32.
6. 434 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 2006).
7. Id. at 954; see also Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due Process Forgotten: The Problem of
Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV. 103, 128 n.201 (2009).
8. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 215-16 (1983); see also Pamela
H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4-5, 8 (2002) (“Private justice is not simply a
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In the recently decided case of Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit brought new attention to the professional-plaintiff
controversy.9 In Gordon, the plaintiff set up his e-mail account so
that he would be spammed for the purpose of bringing lawsuits
under the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing (CAN-SPAM) Act of 2003.10 Just as Article III of the
Constitution requires that a plaintiff suffer an injury in order to
bring a lawsuit,11 the CAN-SPAM Act has a statutory standing
requirement that asks whether a plaintiff has been “adversely
affected by a violation.”12 The court, in declining to find that the
plaintiff had standing, emphasized the nature of the litigant:
As Gordon concedes, he is a professional plaintiff. Since at least
2004, Gordon has held no employment. He has never been
compensated for any of his purported Internet services, and his
only income source has come from monetary settlements from
his anti-spam litigation campaign.... Gordon’s status is uniquely
relevant to the statutory standing question here.13
The Ninth Circuit decided that the plaintiff in Gordon failed to meet
the statutory standing requirement, in part because he was not a
true injured party, but rather a professional plaintiff running a
“litigation mill.”14 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gould noted that private causes
of action, such as the one that Congress provided to citizens in the
CAN-SPAM Act, are the descendants of a long line of remedies
provided by common law to fight “perceived injustice[s].”15 However,
the common law “did not develop remedies for people who gratu-
itously created circumstances that would support a legal claim and
acted with the chief aim of collecting a damage award.”16 Because
helpful adjunct to public regulation. Done correctly, it is an essential ingredient.”).
9. 575 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2009).
10. Id. at 1055. The CAN-SPAM Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (2006).
11. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining “injury” as a
concrete, actual “invasion of a legally protected interest”).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1).
13. Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1056.
14. Id. at 1057.
15. Id. at 1067 (Gould, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 1067-68.
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Congress did not intend that the CAN-SPAM Act grant standing to
“all persons,” but limited standing to those who had suffered true
injuries, the Gordon plaintiff could not maintain an action because
the alleged harm did not “proximately cause[ ]” the damages.17
As the use of statutes allowing citizens to sue to enforce the law
continues to grow,18 legislatures and courts will be faced with an
important dilemma: in private enforcement actions in which
plaintiffs have taken significant steps to inflict legal injuries upon
themselves for the purpose of earning money, should the law give
them statutory standing to sue?
This Note explores that question. Part I defines professional
plaintiffs with three criteria: their motivation to make money, their
role in bringing about their injury, and the frequency with which
they sue. Courts typically look to these factors when determining
whether the plaintiff is a professional who should be denied
standing.19 In contrast to the Gordon court’s opinion, this Part
argues that none of these criteria appropriately separates profes-
sional litigants from ordinary plaintiffs for the purpose of denying
professional plaintiffs statutory standing.
Part II follows the evolution of private enforcement actions from
the historical qui tam suit that any citizen could bring to the
modern statutes that grant remedies only to those who suffer
personalized injuries.20 If Congress introduced the personalized
injury standing requirement into citizen suit statutes to address
problems with “bounty hunters” who would repeatedly bring suit
under qui tam provisions for monetary gain,21 then that purpose
has been frustrated. This Part argues that modern professional
plaintiffs have adapted to the personalized injury requirement by
“manufactur[ing]”22 injuries to escape the standing requirement
17. Id. at 1067-69.
18. See Bucy, supra note 8, at 5 (“Private justice ... has grown exponentially over the past
few decades.”).
19. See infra Part I.B.
20. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (describing the difference between the
two types of actions).
21. The origins of the personalized injury requirement are fairly complex, but deterring
professional plaintiffs was one consideration. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
22. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1068 (Gould, J., concurring) (discussing “manufactured
claims”). Throughout this Note, this term is used to refer to a plaintiff’s act of bringing an
injury upon himself.
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and return to the era in which qui tam actions predominated. A
personalized injury standing requirement is meaningless when
its definition is so broad that it can easily be “manufactured” by
anyone.23 
Part III examines efforts by Congress and judges to bar pro-
fessional plaintiffs from the courthouse by narrowing the injury
standing requirements of private enforcement action statutes. The
goal of this narrowing is to find an optimal level of permissiveness
that will exclude professional plaintiffs from the justice system24
while at the same time leaving the courthouse door open to
plaintiffs with legitimate grievances.25 Although standing require-
ments vary among statutes, legislatures and judges generally make
it more difficult for professional plaintiffs to “manufacture” injuries
by (1) narrowing the definition of the injury, or (2) narrowing the
definition of the plaintiff. Because many citizen suit statutes have
similar standing provisions, legislatures should draft or amend
these statutes to specify characteristics of injuries or plaintiffs that
serve as good proxies for when plaintiffs are professional. Such
careful lawmaking will ultimately save judicial time and effort.
Part IV proposes guidelines for legislatures to use when formulat-
ing these modified personalized injury standing requirements. In
statutes in which the legislature wants to deny standing to profes-
sional plaintiffs,26 lawmakers should make the personalized injury
standing requirements meaningful by adhering to general rules for
each of the two types of standing restrictions.27 For those restric-
tions that narrow the definition of the plaintiff, the legislature
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1069 (Gould, J., concurring) (“[H]ere the CAN-SPAM
statutory language grants a private right of action not to ‘all persons’ regardless of injury, but
only to IAS providers who suffer adverse effect. These requirements make clear that a
litigation-seeking party in Gordon’s circumstances has no standing to proceed under the CAN-
SPAM Act.”).
25. See Bucy, supra note 8, at 27 n.142 (“The Conference Committee recognizes the need
to reduce significantly the filing of meritless securities lawsuits without hindering the ability
of victims of fraud to pursue legitimate claims.” (quoting the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995) (Conf. Rep.))).
26. In some situations, a legislature may want to encourage professional plaintiffs to file
suit because they help to enforce a statute. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1069 (Gould, J.,
concurring) (discussing standing in the housing discrimination context).
27. See infra Part III for more on the two types of personalized injury standing
restrictions.
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should ensure that the required characteristics of the plaintiff are
(1) consistent with the goals of the statute, (2) costly or undesirable
for the average person to adopt, (3) easy and noncontroversial for
courts to determine, and (4) capable of separating the professional
plaintiff from the ordinary plaintiff. Restrictions that narrow the
definition of the injury should meet the same factors, except that the
word “manufacture” should be substituted for the word “adopt” in
factor (2).
I. THE PROBLEM: IDENTIFYING A PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFF AMONG
ORDINARY PLAINTIFFS
A. Defining the Professional Plaintiff
Professional plaintiffs are the chameleons of civil litigation, in
that the statutory provision under which they sue often dictates
their nature.28 Stereotypical images that define professional plain-
tiffs and their attorneys in the popular imagination arise from
these different contexts: the wheelchair-using litigant demanding
hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees because a
hotel bathroom was allegedly in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA);29 a family gleefully awaiting the arrival of
credit offers in the mail to look for potential violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act;30 and the investor who owns “a few shares of
stock in each of a large number of companies,”31 ready to “race to the
courthouse”32 the moment a company’s stock price plummets.
28. For examples of how the structure of particular private enforcement statutes affects
the actions of professional plaintiffs, see infra Part I.B.
29. Adam A. Milani, Go Ahead. Make My 90 Days: Should Plaintiffs Be Required To
Provide Notice to Defendants Before Filing Suit Under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 107, 178-80 (relating the story of a lawsuit against Clint
Eastwood’s Mission Ranch). The ADA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
30. See Murray v. Cingular Wireless II, L.L.C., 242 F.R.D. 415, 418 (N.D. Ill. 2005). The
Fair Credit Reporting Act is found at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006). 
31. Patrick M. Garry et al., The Irrationality of Shareholder Class Action Lawsuits: A
Proposal for Reform, 49 S.D. L. REV. 275, 281 (2004). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006).
32. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
533, 537 (1997). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)), attempted to put an end to
the “race.” Fisch, supra at 537.
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For example, the Gordon plaintiff, James S. Gordon, Jr., made a
business out of catching and suing spammers.33 A technological
wizard operating behind a digital curtain,34 he oversaw his Internet
domain, subscribing to hundreds of “online promotions” and “prize
giveaways.”35 A flood of commercial e-mails poured forth from
businesses and marketers, including the defendant Virtumundo,
landing in Gordon’s intentionally unfiltered inboxes.36 Gordon, who
referred to his efforts as “research,” sued the companies behind the
e-mails, seeking “injunctive relief, several millions of dollars in
statutory and treble damages, and his attorney’s fees and costs.”37
Other people, known as “clients,” helped Gordon in his efforts,
feeding his litigation with tens of thousands of additional e-mails.
Gordon rewarded these individuals with settlement money accord-
ing to their proportional contribution of e-mails to a winning
lawsuit.38
Despite superficial differences, professional plaintiffs like Gordon
are members of a species of litigant—a species with a few defining
characteristics. First, and most importantly, professional plaintiffs
are professional, meaning that they are in the business of bringing
lawsuits with the primary aim of winning large sums of money.39
They and their lawyers may claim to have other goals, such as
fighting for the underrepresented “little guy” against powerful
33. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009).
34. This analogy is borrowed from L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 183-85
(Geo. M. Hill Co. 1900).
35. Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1046.
36. Id. at 1046, 1055.
37. Id. at 1046-47.
38. Id. at 1056.
39. See Borden, supra note 1, at 68. Regardless of merit, the “perceived threat” of a costly
lawsuit is sometimes enough to force a company to settle with the professional plaintiff,
making litigation unnecessary. See Jane Easter Bahls & Steven C. Bahls, Suiting Up,
ENTREPRENEUR MAG., May 1999, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/magazine/
entrepreneur/1999/may/17684.html.
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interests,40 but these goals remain secondary considerations to the
ultimate goal of collecting damages.41
Second, professional plaintiffs often play a role in bringing about
the injuries that serve as the foundation for their lawsuits,42 al-
though some play a more active role than others.43 One example is
the professional plaintiff with a disability suing under the ADA who
actively scours local businesses for obscure, technical violations to
serve as the basis for a cause of action.44
Litigiousness is the third characteristic that distinguishes pro-
fessional plaintiffs from ordinary litigants,45 with a single plaintiff
often bringing multiple lawsuits under a statute granting a citizen
the right to a remedy for legal wrongs.46 The plaintiffs are often
represented by the same attorneys in their efforts,47 and usually
receive compensation from their attorneys for permitting the
lawyers to put the plaintiffs’ names on the lawsuits.48
40. See Borden, supra note 1, at 68 (noting plaintiffs’ lawyers’ “flood of rhetoric about
private attorneys general battling against corporate shenanigans on behalf of the little guy”);
see also Milani, supra note 29, at 133 (quoting a professional plaintiffs’ lawyer for individuals
with disabilities as stating that “[e]very disabled person who comes after a lawsuit will find
nice clear parking spaces, rails, ramps and bathrooms they can access—all that is fixed when
we walk away from a case”). 
41. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1068 (Gould, J., concurring).
42. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part I.B.1.
44. See Linda H. Wade & Timothy J. Inacio, A Man in a Wheelchair and His Lawyer Go
into a Bar: Serial ADA Litigation Is No Joke, 25 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 31 (2006). But see Milani,
supra note 29, at 133 (summarizing the benefits of professional plaintiff-driven ADA
litigation).
45. See In re Gibson Greetings Sec. Litig., 159 F.R.D. 499, 501 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“It is not
disputed that Mr. Steiner has filed approximately 182 class actions in the last twelve years....
While the Court is not prepared to define a ‘professional class action plaintiff,’ it is clear that
a person who has filed such a vast number of lawsuits comes within any definition of that
phrase.”).
46. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text; see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall
S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57
VAND. L. REV. 133, 156 (2004) (observing the “obvious benefits from specialization by law
firms” that represent professional plaintiffs in shareholder litigation).
47. See Stewart v. Stanley, 5 So. 2d 531, 536 (La. 1941) (observing that “the same
attorneys appear over and over again as representing these plaintiffs”); Thompson & Thomas,
supra note 46, at 157 (stating that “professional plaintiffs almost always appear in cases
represented by the same firm over and over again”).
48. See In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (referring
to professional securities plaintiffs as “hired gun[s]”).
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Thus, in many ways, Gordon is simply a new episode in the
money-drenched saga that inevitably ensues when a legislature
grants citizens the power to enforce the law. But, as Judge Gould
noted in his concurrence, the “gratuitously created circumstances”
underlying Gordon were particularly extreme.49
B. Difficulties in Distinguishing Professional Plaintiffs
“[T]he burdens Gordon complains of are almost exclusively self-
imposed and purposefully undertaken.” 50
The Gordon case illustrates an instance of a larger phenomenon:
plaintiffs who bring an injury upon themselves for monetary gain.
Judge Gould suggested that Gordon’s involvement in causing his
injury could be used to deny him standing.51 But when one compares
“amateur” plaintiffs, who aim to enforce the law, with professional
plaintiffs, whose goal is to make money, it is difficult to distinguish
between the two—especially if courts do not also consider plaintiffs’
motivation in bringing the lawsuit or their litigious nature, both of
which this Note argues are improper bases for denying standing.
It is this chameleon-like ability to blend in with ordinary plaintiffs
by carefully “manufacturing” injuries that makes professional
plaintiffs so difficult to identify. As Judge Gould observed, plaintiffs
like Gordon “purposely structure themselves to look like one of the
limited entities eligible to sue but do so for the primary purpose of
collecting damages and settlements from litigation.”52 The following
sections consider each factor that the Gordon court used to deny the
plaintiff standing and argue that none of them should be considered
as part of a standing analysis.
49. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (“But, for a person seeking to operate a litigation factory, the purported harm is
illusory and more in the nature of manufactured circumstances in an attempt to enable a
claim.”).
50. Id. at 1057 (majority opinion).
51. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
52. Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1068 (Gould, J., concurring).
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1. The Plaintiff’s Role in the Injury
Suppose that an “amateur” plaintiff with a disability visits a
restaurant with the intention of having dinner. Frustrated at the
lack of handicapped parking spaces,53 she sues the business owner
under the ADA.54 Later, a “professional” plaintiff with a disability
arrives at the restaurant with the sole intent of looking for viola-
tions of the ADA on which to base a lawsuit. Discovering no
handicapped parking spaces, she also sues the business owner
under the statute. Short of somehow ascertaining each plaintiff’s
motivations in this scenario, it would be difficult—if not impossi-
ble—for a court to distinguish the professional plaintiff from the
regular litigant based on actions alone. If the plaintiffs could be said
to have brought the injuries upon themselves, it is only in the sense
that they discovered existing violations.55 The difference between
the plaintiffs in this scenario is that the professional plaintiff
intended to find violations, whereas the ordinary litigant did not.56
As a further illustration, consider a shareholder who purchases
a few shares in hundreds of companies, hoping that a stock price
decline in at least one of the companies will serve as the fruitful
basis for a suit under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.57 Here,
the professional litigant has taken a more active role than in the
previous example—purchasing shares in hundreds of companies in
the way that Gordon actively subscribed to hundreds of promotions,
hoping that it would result in spam.58 But if an injury results, the
53. This example is based on an actual case. See Milani, supra note 29, at 126 (discussing
Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1049 (S.D. Cal. 1998)).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
55. Congress may have intended the difficulty in distinguishing the plaintiffs in this
scenario. As Judge Gould noted, “Congress provided standing to ‘any person’ subjected to
disability discrimination in violation of the ADA, and it also did not expressly require a
showing of injury or adverse effect from the discrimination.” Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1069 (Gould,
J., concurring). Standing that results from simply discovering existing violations is known as
“tester standing” in the housing discrimination context. See id.; see also infra notes 156-58 and
accompanying text.
56. Wade & Inacio, supra note 44, at 31 (explaining that a “disabled [professional plaintiff]
will visit as many businesses as possible at the specific request of ... that person’s lawyer,
hoping to uncover ADA violations upon which to sue”).
57. The court in Gluck v. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 544 (N.D. Tex. 1997),
mentioned this scenario.
58. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1046, 1055.
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professional plaintiff-shareholder will not have caused the share
price to drop any more than an ordinary investor did—or any more
than Gordon caused the online marketing companies to send him
spam e-mails. Again, the difference between the professional
plaintiff-investor and the ordinary investor is found not in the action
of purchasing the shares but in the intent with which each party
made the purchase. So, if a court determining whether a litigant has
standing was to consider only the litigant’s actions prior to the
alleged injury in a shareholder suit, it would be difficult to distin-
guish a professional plaintiff from a regular litigant by looking only
at the role each played in bringing about his or her injury. 
The Ninth Circuit in Gordon attempted to resolve this problem by
inquiring into the plaintiff’s motivation in bringing his lawsuit.59 By
considering the facts of the case, the court attempted to infer the
“professional” motivation of the plaintiff by determining that he
frequently sought out violations of the CAN-SPAM statute for the
purpose of filing multiple lawsuits to make a significant amount of
money.60 But considering a plaintiff’s litigiousness and motivation
in filing suit poses other problems that make both factors improper
bases for denying a plaintiff standing.
2. Litigiousness
Case history and policy indicate that litigiousness—meaning that
a plaintiff seeks out many violations and files lawsuits based on
them—is not a proper way to distinguish the professional plaintiff
from the ordinary litigant if the lawsuits are filed in good faith. For
example, in Murray v. Cingular Wireless II, L.L.C., in which a pro-
fessional plaintiff sued for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the court refused to “adopt a rule limiting a plaintiff ” to a
certain number of lawsuits so long as each lawsuit had an adequate
factual basis.61 In a case involving a possible professional plaintiff
suing under the ADA, a California district court similarly found that
a plaintiff with a disability could not be penalized as a “vexatious
litigant” if the plaintiff had a reasonable explanation for filing
59. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
61. 242 F.R.D. 415, 419 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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multiple lawsuits and claiming multiple injuries, and also pos-
sessed a “good faith belief that he [would] prevail on the merits of
most of his claims.”62 One scholar has suggested that evidence of a
litigious plaintiff’s propensity to bring lawsuits should be inadmissi-
ble as improper character evidence that has no bearing on “the
merits of the current case.”63
Congress has permitted courts to consider litigiousness in an
effort to deny professional plaintiffs standing under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Plaintiffs bringing share-
holder class actions pursuant to the Act may be prohibited from
serving as lead plaintiffs if they have already brought five securities
class actions throughout any three-year period.64 However, the
provision is not mandatory and courts have often granted plaintiffs
an exemption from it, finding that litigiousness may actually be
beneficial to the legal system.65 Under this reasoning, filing multiple
lawsuits provides plaintiffs with experience that allows them to
monitor their attorneys more effectively during the course of a
lawsuit.66 In addition, in a case brought under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the Seventh Circuit wrote that there did not appear
to be case law suggesting “that someone whose rights have been
violated by 50 different persons may sue only a subset of the
offenders.”67
Even if litigiousness was to be considered as a characteristic of
professional plaintiffs, as it has been in a few ADA cases,68 it would
62. Molski v. Rapazzini Winery, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1210-11 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
63. Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 474-75 (1986).
64. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)).
65. See Scheuerman, supra note 7, at 128 n.201 (summarizing cases that explain the
benefits of litigiousness); see also Murray v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir.
2006) (“Repeat litigants may be better able to monitor the conduct of counsel, who as a
practical matter are the class’s real champions.”). But see In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206
F.R.D. 427, 457 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (declining to appoint a litigious plaintiff as lead plaintiff in
a securities action because it would result in “fractured attention and resources with respect
to [the] suit”).
66. See supra note 65.
67. Murray, 434 F.3d at 954.
68. See, e.g., Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864 (C.D. Cal. 2004),
aff’d sub nom., Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that, “[a]lthough litigiousness alone is insufficient” to support a finding of vexatiousness, “it
is a factor the Court considers indicative of an intent to harass”). In the Mandarin case, the
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be possible for many such plaintiffs to escape detection by settling
lawsuits out of court, leaving no record of their tendency to sue.69
This tactic would make litigiousness an unreliable indicator of a
plaintiff’s money-seeking motivation, as it would be possible that a
professional plaintiff had settled hundreds of lawsuits out of court
before bringing one to trial.
3. Motivation
Motivation also fails as a proper basis for denying a professional
plaintiff standing. In the 1941 case of Stewart v. Stanley, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana decided that “professional plaintiff[ ]”
taxpayers had standing to sue despite a history of litigiousness
because the court found that it had “no right to inquire into the
motives of the plaintiffs.”70 But unlike most modern professional
plaintiffs, the Stewart litigants were suing for injunctive rather than
monetary relief, and did not bring the alleged injury upon them-
selves.71 Thus, the plaintiffs could not have brought suit out of pure
financial motivation.
Several other courts have also held that it is not proper to
consider the plaintiff’s motivation for bringing suit in other
contexts.72 In cases involving vexatious litigants, in which courts
court also considered the “textual and factual similarity” of the myriad complaints brought
by the plaintiff. Id. For another case in which litigiousness was considered, see Brother v.
Tiger Partner, L.L.C., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1374-75 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (“This type of shotgun
litigation undermines both the spirit and purpose of the ADA.”).
69. See Bahls & Bahls, supra note 39 (“It’s difficult to track these people or gauge the
prevalence of their scam because many agree to a quick settlement without ever filing formal
charges.”).
70. 5 So. 2d 531, 536 (La. 1941) (“[T]he right of a person to institute a law suit [sic] is not
dependent upon or affected by the motive which prompts him in the exercise of his right.”
(quoting Welsh v. Bd. of Levee Comm’rs, 168 La. 1037, 1042 (1929))).
71. Id. at 534-35.
72. See, e.g., Somers v. AAA Temp. Servs., Inc., 284 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ill. 1972) (“It is
generally accepted that where the plaintiff asserts a valid cause of action, his motive in
bringing the action is immaterial.”); Bull v. Int’l Power Co., 92 A. 796, 797 (N.J. Ch. 1914) (“So
far at least as the statutory feature of the case is concerned, the complainants’ motives are
entirely immaterial.”). But see Knapp Engraving Co. v. Keystone Photo Engraving Corp., 1
A.D.2d 170, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (stating that a plaintiff’s good faith in filing suit “may
properly be explored”).
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may examine motive,73 courts typically consider whether the
plaintiff is bringing the suit in bad faith without a reasonable
chance of winning—not whether the plaintiff wants to make money
from the suit.74 An “inherent difficulty [in] proving state of mind”
exists when assessing financial motivation because it requires
peering into the “mental processes” of a person without the benefit
of “‘eyewitness’ testimony.”75 As one congressman noted in the con-
text of the ADA, “it is almost impossible to prove” that a plaintiff
intends to sue for money damages instead of to further the goals of
the statute.76 The analysis that a court would have to undertake in
each trial to determine whether the plaintiff brought the suit for
money would also waste judicial time and resources, saddling courts
with significant difficulties in routine cases that “might seriously
obscure their real merits.”77 In addition, in the absence of plaintiffs’
admissions that the prospect of monetary gain motivated them to
bring a lawsuit, intent would have to be inferred from their
litigiousness or role in bringing about their injury.78 As mentioned
previously, courts should not consider these factors when determin-
ing whether a plaintiff has standing to sue.79
Because of the time and effort a court must expend in consid-
ering the above three factors, legislatures and courts should use
a different analysis to deny standing to professional plaintiffs.
Part II explores the history of private enforcement actions and
suggests that the personalized injury standing requirement re-
73. See Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (setting out a test for
determining whether a litigant is vexatious).
74. See id; see also Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (E.D.
Cal. 2006) (finding, in the context of a professional ADA plaintiff, that the content of the
plaintiff’s allegations, rather than litigiousness, was the true test of frivolity). But see Molski
v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 866 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“Molski’s motivation is,
ultimately, to extract a cash settlement.”); Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278,
1285 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (stating that the plaintiff’s “explanation for his initial visit to the
Facility was disingenuous”).
75. Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 1130, 1133 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
76. ADA Notification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 18 (2000) (statement of Rep. Mark Foley, United States
Congressman from Florida).
77. See Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 99 F. Supp. 522, 525 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (quoting
Dickerman v. N. Trust Co., 176 U.S. 181, 190 (1900)).
78. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
79. See supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.
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presents a better focus for legislatures. As this Note will soon make
evident, professional plaintiffs have plied their trade for as long as
private enforcement bounties have existed and greed has been a
part of human nature.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: THE
MOVEMENT TOWARD A PERSONALIZED INJURY REQUIREMENT
A. The Early Professional Plaintiffs: English “Common Informers”
and Qui Tam Suits 
“[T]here arose a small but ruthless and unprincipled group of
people who, from time to time, interested themselves in particu-
lar sets of statutes the enforcement of which would provide them
with easy and appreciable profit.” 80
It was England circa 1750. Lawlessness and debauchery pervaded
London like a deep fog. So-called “lesser infringements of the law”
proliferated, including gambling, petty thievery, and the unlicensed
operation of dancing establishments.81 As historian and criminolo-
gist Leon Radzinowicz explains, the authorities, having used other
methods of combating the “more serious crimes,” turned to the
populace to tackle the misdemeanors that plagued the “morals and
good order of society in general.”82 In this atmosphere of villainy, the
qui tam suit came into wide use, offering a monetary bounty to the
ordinary citizen for “act[ing] as a policeman, and as a protector of
the community against a vast mass of delinquency.”83
But the empowerment of a large army of citizen-policemen did
not come without costs. As one commentator observed, “qui tam was
80. 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 147 (1956).
81. Id. at 142, 144-45.
82. Id. at 142, 145-46; see also Robert W. Fischer, Jr., Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The
Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778, 778-79 & n.4 (1973)
(“Generally speaking, qui tam appears to have been used where individual violations of a
statute were of minor importance, but an aggregated series of violations was of some social
significance.” (citing 2 LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 146 (1948))).
83. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 145-47. Radzinowicz defined a common informer as
“a person who brought certain transgressions to the notice of the authorities and instituted
proceedings, not because he, personally, had been aggrieved or wished to see justice done, but
because under the law he was entitled to a part of any fine which might be imposed.” Id. at
138.
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controlled by an elite group of professional plaintiffs.”84 These
litigants had many of the characteristics of modern professional
plaintiffs, including their ability to specialize in bringing certain
causes of action, their litigious nature, and their primary aim of
winning money.85 
Early professional plaintiffs also posed many of the same
problems as their modern counterparts. An anonymous nineteenth-
century pamphleteer noted that there were “many cases wherein the
informer is so interested, that he would rather nurse the criminal
than check the crime.”86 In addition, the Metropolitan Police spoke
out against informers, observing that they “do not take ... measures
to prevent parties infringing the law, but merely to entrap them in
order to get the penalty.”87 Modern professional litigants pose
similar problems. As one commentator has observed, “deterrence
usually takes a back seat to the compensation goal.”88 Additional
problems of early qui tam suits, which mirror those presented by the
modern professional plaintiff, include that the availability of
bounties for qui tam suits pitted citizens against each other, that
they provided plaintiffs with “excessive powers,” and that they were
“subject to abuse.”89
As Radzinowicz describes, English society turned against the
common informer almost immediately, with the literature identify-
ing various insults directed at them. Edward Coke called them
“viperous vermin,” and others referred to them as “unprincipled
pettifoggers.”90 Eventually, popular anger led to the abolishment
84. Fischer, supra note 82, at 799 (citation omitted).
85. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 147-50; Fischer, supra note 82, at 779 & n.6. See
supra Part I.A for more details on the characteristics of modern professional plaintiffs.
86. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 152 (quoting Considerations of a Police Report, of the
Year of Our Lord, 1816, with a Plan for Effectually Suppressing ... Thieving, in 21
PAMPHLETEER 210 (1822)).
87. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 153 (quoting Report from the Select Committee on the
Police of the Metropolis, in 16 PARL. PAPERS 1 (1834)).
88. Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation: The
Role of Institutional Investors, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 156 (1997); see also Gluck v.
CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“The best relief for the plaintiff class
is not always the relief which would be sought by a ‘professional plaintiff.’”).
89. See Fischer, supra note 82, at 779; see also Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775 (2000) (“For obvious reasons, the informer statutes were
highly subject to abuse.”).
90. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 139.
278 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:261
of qui tam statutes in England.91 In the United States, however,
qui tam actions survived, primarily through the False Claims Act,
which originated during the Civil War, representing the most
popular qui tam suit in the United States that remains to this day.92
At least one commentator has argued that qui tam actions also
continued in a different form: as statutes granting citizens a private
right to enforce the law, but with the additional requirement that
the citizens have suffered a personalized injury. This reasoning
makes modern “injured” professional plaintiffs simply a different
type of qui tam plaintiff.93
B. Taming the Professional Plaintiff: The Introduction of the
Personalized Injury Requirement
Throughout centuries of American and English legal history, the
notion that a legislature could grant standing to any person to
uphold certain laws through private enforcement actions persisted.94
In the United States, these laws did not initially distinguish
between those plaintiffs who suffered a personalized injury and
those who sued based on an injury to society because the Supreme
Court had not yet read a personalized injury requirement into
Article III of the Constitution.95 Although the rise of this require
91. Fischer, supra note 82, at 779.
92. Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 768 (“[T]he False Claims Act (FCA) is the most
frequently used of a handful of extant laws creating a form of civil action known as qui tam.”).
The False Claims Act is a qui tam statute that permits any citizen to sue a federal contractor
for defrauding the government. Id. at 765; see also Fischer, supra note 82, at 787, 788 & n.59.
93. See Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 84-87
(describing the gradual move to private enforcement statutes with a personalized injury
requirement); see also Fischer, supra note 82, at 785 (“It is possible to draft a statute so that
the class of injured parties is very large.”).
94. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170-77 (1992) (chronicling the lengthy history of private
enforcement actions without a personalized injury requirement); Evan Caminker, Comment,
The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341-42 (1989) (“Statutes providing
for actions by a common informer, who himself has no interest whatever in the controversy
other than that given by statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England, and
in this country ever since the foundation of our Government.” (quoting United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.4 (1943))). 
95. See Sunstein, supra note 94, at 177 (finding that, before World War II, “people ha[d]
standing if the law ha[d] granted them a right to bring suit”); see also Elizabeth Magill,
Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2009) (“[F]or several
decades in the middle of the last century, Congress was allowed to authorize legal challenges
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ment resulted primarily from the historical and constitutional
development of private enforcement actions,96 courts and legisla-
tures in modern times have also used tighter personalized injury
requirements as a way to reduce the influence of professional
plaintiffs on the justice system.97
Early professional plaintiffs had an easier time obtaining
statutory bounties than the professional litigants active today
because the lack of a personal injury requirement meant that they
could earn money for reporting criminal conduct that was widely
practiced in society.98 The qui tam procedure used by early plain-
tiffs, which allowed any citizen to sue to enforce the law, can be
distinguished from the procedure used by modern plaintiffs under
statutes that “limit[ ] the class of potential plaintiffs” through the
use of standing requirements.99 Qui tam professional plaintiffs did
not have to show an “individual wrong” to themselves,100 whereas
modern professional plaintiffs must typically make such a showing
when bringing private enforcement actions that offer a monetary
bounty—a type of suit that plaintiffs have widely used in the United
States during the last few decades.101
to government action by parties whose only cognizable interest was just that: that the
government abide by the law.”).
96. See Magill, supra note 95, at 1160-62, 1167-78 (reviewing the “death” of Congress’s
ability to grant standing to the public in suits against the government in the absence of a
personalized injury); Sunstein, supra note 94, at 198-202 (discussing the Court’s reasoning
in Lujan).
97. See infra Parts II.C, III.
98. See RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 146 (stating that common informers were “on alert
to discover any infringements of the law”).
99. Fischer, supra note 82, at 783-85 (discussing “injured party plaintiffs”). The CAN-
SPAM Act’s requirement that plaintiffs show they have been “adversely affected” by the
defendant is one such requirement. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Some early
plaintiffs did suffer an injury, but the qui tam procedure was more prevalent at the time. See
The History and Development of Qui Tam, supra note 93, at 87.
100. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 731 (2004) (“According to one lawyer, indeed, ‘[q]ui tam actions are judged
with great jealousy, because the plaintiff does not seek to recover anything that he has lost,
nor to redress any individual wrong, but only to expose the faults of his neighbor and turn
them to his own profit.’” (quoting Vaughn v. McQueen, 9 Mo. 330, 331 (1845))).
101. See Bucy, supra note 8, at 13 (“There are a number of statutes that empower private
persons, as well as public prosecutors, to sue those who violate the statutes.”). This Note
focuses on private enforcement statutes with standing requirements that require an injury.
Qui tam statutes used by professional plaintiffs, such as the False Claims Act, are beyond the
scope of this Note.
280 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:261
Scholars have attempted to categorize private enforcement
actions based on the purpose of a lawsuit and whether the underly-
ing action requires a personalized injury. Professor Pamela Bucy
classifies the early qui tam professionals as operating under the
“‘common good’ private justice” model.102 As she states, these actions
“are brought by plaintiffs who have suffered no personal injury but
who have been given authority to sue malfeasors because their law-
suits ... bring additional resources to law enforcement’s efforts.”103
Most modern professional plaintiffs bring private enforcement
actions under what Professor Bucy calls the “‘victim’ private justice”
model that applies to “those who have been injured by a defendant’s
breach of statutory duty.”104 This historical distinction is important
because professional plaintiffs have rendered it meaningless.
C. How Modern Professional Plaintiffs Have Defeated the    
Personalized Injury Requirement
“The CAN-SPAM Act was enacted to protect individuals and
legitimate businesses—not to support a litigation mill for
entrepreneurs like Gordon.”105
Today’s professional plaintiffs would like to return to the era of
the common informer, in which any person could sue a private party
for violating the law to collect a monetary bounty.106 But the recent
popularization of the personalized injury requirement for stand-
ing107 and its tightening by courts and legislatures108 have frustrated
these goals. Guided by the prospect of financial gain, professional
plaintiffs have adapted to overcome this personal injury require-
ment by creating injuries where none previously existed so as to
appear indistinguishable from ordinary plaintiffs.109 Indeed, in some
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 13-15. Plaintiffs suing under the Securities Exchange Act represent an exception
because Professor Bucy considers them to occupy a third, “hybrid” category. Id. at 23.
105. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009).
106. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
107. See supra Part II.B.
108. See infra Part III.
109. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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cases, it is nearly impossible to separate the “real” plaintiffs from
the professionals without peering into the plaintiffs’ minds.110
These attempts to “blend in” with actually injured plaintiffs
represent a successful method that modern professional litigants
use to avoid the personalized injury requirement. In recent times,
legislatures have imposed tighter plaintiff injury requirements in
part to keep “bounty hunters” away from the courthouse.111 But the
statutes that professional plaintiffs use often define the injury
element so broadly that it can be easily “manufactured” by
anyone.112 As Judge Gould noted, when a plaintiff can create an
injury, it renders the injury requirement of the statute illusory,
providing any person who “manufacture[s]” an injury with the
ability to collect the statutory bounty.113 
Vague statutory standing requirements also violate the tenets
of modern constitutional standing doctrine. Current Article III
jurisprudence denies standing to plaintiffs bringing “generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed through the political
process.”114 If a statute defines the injury so broadly that any person
can “manufacture” it with little trouble, the injury becomes a gen-
eralized grievance, and thus the statutory standing requirement is
unconstitutional.
For example, in Nike v. Kasky, the plaintiff sued under a
California citizen suit statute prohibiting false advertising.115 The
statute’s standing provision provided that a plaintiff must “have
suffered injury in fact and have lost money or property as a result
110. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
111. See Fischer, supra note 82, at 785 (“[When] the class of injured parties is very large
... the possibilities for abuse would be almost equal to those arising from the universal class
of plaintiffs under a qui tam statute.”); see also infra Part III.
112. The CAN-SPAM Act used by the plaintiff in the Gordon case required only that the
plaintiff be a provider of “Internet access service” who was “adversely affected” by the
defendant’s violation. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); see
also infra note 117 and accompanying text. By setting up an e-mail server and signing up e-
mail addresses for online promotions, Gordon was able to satisfy these requirements with
minimal effort. Cf. supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
114. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 171 (1997).
115. 539 U.S. 654, 656 (2003); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REV. 589, 591 (2005).
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of the defendant’s unfair competition.”116 Professor Trevor W.
Morrison observes that the statute’s “injury requirement alone may
often be inadequate [to protect free speech] because injury will be
too easy to establish.”117 He also writes that plaintiffs suing under
the California statute could easily “establish ‘injury’ on the basis of
a single product purchase or similar low-cost, commonplace activ-
ity,” and that the statute thus fails to prevent “ideologically and
financially motivated plaintiffs” from bringing suit.118
The CAN-SPAM Act, which served as the basis of Gordon’s
lawsuit, provides a further illustration. It has two primary standing
requirements: the plaintiff must (1) be a “provider of Internet access
service” and (2) have been “adversely affected” by the defendant’s
alleged violations.119 Had the Ninth Circuit not used the legislative
history of the Act to interpret the statute as requiring that the
Internet access service be “bona fide,” and had the court found that
Gordon’s action of bringing spam upon himself constituted an
adverse effect,120 then Gordon would have succeeded in suing on an
injury he created and brought upon himself. If the court had
reached that result, then only a small investment of time and money
would be required for the average person to register a domain name
and sign up for online “promotions” and “prize giveaways” to obtain
enough spam necessary to file a complaint and reap the financial
rewards of the CAN-SPAM Act.121 In other words, the original
personalized injury requirement was not personal enough; it did not
sufficiently limit the class of plaintiffs who could sue and did not
require a serious injury.
116. Morrison, supra note 115, at 639 (quotations omitted).
117. Id. at 640.
118. Id. at 640-41.
119. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We first address
whether Gordon is a ‘provider of Internet access service’ who, if adversely affected by a
statutory violation, has private standing to bring CAN-SPAM Act claims.”).
120. The court declined to reach this result. See id. at 1055-57 (discussing how Gordon
failed to meet the standing requirements). Gordon could not demonstrate injury because “the
harms redressable under the CAN-SPAM Act must parallel the limited private right of action
and therefore should reflect those types of harms uniquely encountered by IAS providers.” Id.
at 1053. Gordon failed to show that he was a protected plaintiff because the court’s “review
of the congressional record reveal[ed] a legitimate concern that the private right of action be
circumscribed and confined to a narrow group of private plaintiffs.” Id. at 1050.
121. See generally id. at 1045-46 (describing how Gordon created his antispam operation).
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Comparing the CAN-SPAM Act to a private enforcement statute
with a narrower personal injury requirement such as the ADA
demonstrates the importance of a properly focused personal injury
standing requirement in preventing professional plaintiffs from
“manufacturing” injuries. The ADA’s public accommodations pro-
vision contains a standing requirement implying that a plaintiff
bringing a private enforcement action must have a disability.122
Professor Samuel Bagenstos notes that this requirement limits the
plaintiffs who may sue to “the narrowly drawn class of individuals
with disabilities, as defined by the ADA.”123 
It is unlikely that the average professional plaintiff would render
himself disabled for the purpose of bringing a private enforcement
action under the ADA. So, as long as the ADA’s definition of
“disabled” remains tight enough,124 the statute’s narrower, more per-
sonalized injury requirement limits the potential pool of profes-
sional plaintiffs by making it more difficult for the average person
to “manufacture” an injury.125 For the professional plaintiff without
a disability, the cost of creating an injury in this context is probably
prohibitive.
Part III further explores the legal tools that Congress and courts
use to stop professional plaintiffs from suing on “manufactured”
injuries. Toward that end, policymakers have redefined the injury
requirements in statutes favored by professional plaintiffs to make
it more costly and undesirable for the average plaintiff to create an
injury under each statute.
       III. CLASSIFYING STANDING RESTRICTIONS IN PRIVATE       
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS POPULAR WITH PROFESSIONAL PLAINTIFFS
For centuries, professional plaintiffs have been one step ahead of
courts and legislatures in using private enforcement actions to make
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (2006) (referring to “any person who is being subjected to
discrimination on the basis of disability” and “a person with a disability”).
123. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
“Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 27 (2006).
124. The ADA’s definition of “disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
125. See D. Russell Hymas & Brett R. Parkinson, Comment, Architectural Barriers Under
the ADA: An Answer to the Judiciary’s Struggle with Technical Non-Compliance, 39 CAL. W.
L. REV. 349, 373 (2003).
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easy money despite efforts aimed at stopping them.126 Modern
methods used to bar the professional litigant from the courthouse
often involve modifying the statutes under which the litigants sue.
These provisions can be placed into three categories: those that (1)
narrow the definition of the injury necessary to sustain a claim so
that the injury is harder to “manufacture,” (2) narrow the definition
of the plaintiff who may bring a claim by including characteristics
that are costly or undesirable to adopt, or (3) alter or eliminate the
monetary incentives that motivate professional plaintiffs to bring
claims. This Part focuses on the first two categories of methods,
which together modify the “personalized injury” standing require-
ment to make it more “personalized.”127 These methods can be
derived from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, in which he stated that “Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will
give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before,” but
“Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to
bring suit.”128
A. Narrowing the Injury
The first classification includes statutory provisions that narrow
the definition of an injury needed for standing under a citizen suit
statute. These provisions represent the injury portion of the
126. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
127. The third option, reducing or eliminating the monetary incentive for plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits, is misguided because it might also discourage proper litigants from filing lawsuits.
See Bagenstos, supra note 123, at 18 (“Without the prospect of recovering fees, too few
attorneys will be willing to take public interest cases, and the law will be underenforced.”);
see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. For example, Congress entertained the idea of
requiring potential plaintiffs to provide business owners with ninety days to fix alleged ADA
violations before the plaintiffs could sue. Milani, supra note 29, at 135-36. This safe harbor
period would have the effect of barring professional plaintiffs, who would be less likely to file
suit if businesses could correct violations and avoid paying plaintiffs’ attorneys fees. See id.
at 136-37. But it also might prevent amateur plaintiffs from suing if the cost of notification
was too great.
128. 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Bagenstos, supra note 123,
at 27 (discussing how Congress has done this in the context of “the ADA’s public
accommodations title”). Although Justice Kennedy was referring to constitutional standing,
this Note assumes that the same reasoning would apply to statutory standing.
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“personalized injury” requirement that is the defining characteristic
of citizen suit statutes129 and are aimed at making the injury
difficult for plaintiffs to create.130 
For example, courts have already imposed their own standing
requirements under the ADA that narrow the definition of an
injury. As two commentators have noted, plaintiffs alleging a vio-
lation must show a “‘real and immediate threat’ of repeated future
harm.”131 Those scholars believe that this standing requirement
properly prevents professional plaintiffs from “claiming ADA
violations in many places of public accommodation at which it is
highly unlikely that such persons will visit in the future.”132 Here,
courts narrow the definition of the injury so that, in order to create
an injury, professional plaintiffs must visit the establishment they
intend to sue multiple times,133 adding additional cost to their
efforts. The greater the cost, the less likely professional plaintiffs
will find the action worth pursuing.
B. Narrowing the Plaintiff
The second type of standing requirement narrows the definition
of the plaintiff and represents the “personalized” part of the
“personalized injury.” These provisions seek to ensure that the
statute protects only those plaintiffs whom the legislature intended
the statute to protect by requiring some characteristic that is costly
or undesirable for plaintiffs to “manufacture.” A commentator has
129. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
130. Regular plaintiffs “suffer” injuries. Professional plaintiffs “create” injuries. Often, it
is hard to tell the difference. See supra Part I.B.
131. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 373 (quoting Aikins v. St. Helena Hosp., No.
C 93-3933 FMS, 1994 WL 794759, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1994)) (emphasis omitted); see also
Wade & Inacio, supra note 44, at 34 (cataloguing cases in which courts have dismissed suits
for lack of standing on this basis). 
132. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 373. Courts have imposed a similar standing
requirement on plaintiffs suing holders of invalid patents for alleged antitrust violations. Such
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had the ability and desire “to enter the relevant
market,” and that the invalid patent caused the plaintiff to refrain from entering the market.
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 101, 166 (2006).
133. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 370 (“This requirement can be reduced to the
plaintiff showing that (s)he had definite plans to return to the place of public accommodation,
such as a frequently visited restaurant.”).
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suggested that there are statutes in which “a universal class of
plaintiffs will afford too much opportunity for abuse, and the
number of possible plaintiffs should be limited.”134 An example of
this type of provision would be the requirement that an individual
suing under the ADA have a disability because a disability is not
desirable for professional plaintiffs to “manufacture.”135 This pro-
vision at least limits use of ADA remedies to professional plaintiffs
with disabilities.
C. Classifying Other Standing Requirements
Considering the standing requirements of other citizen suit
provisions indicates that most of them can be classified under one
of the two categories above, with some falling under both. The CAN-
SPAM Act’s standing requirement that the plaintiff be a bona fide
“provider of Internet access service,”136 is an example of a require-
ment that narrows the definition of the plaintiff because individuals
who are not providers or individuals who are providers but not bona
fide providers will not have standing to sue under the Act.137 The
Act’s requirement that the plaintiff has been “adversely affected” by
the defendant’s alleged violations138 falls under both categories. This
standing restriction narrows the definition of the injury because it
mandates that the injury be severe enough to constitute an adverse
effect and not merely an inconvenience.139 It further narrows the
definition of the plaintiff because not all bona fide Internet access
providers can sue; only those bona fide providers who have been
adversely affected have standing.140
Similarly, commentators have noted that, under the ADA, the
barrier to the person with a disability must be “within the class of
barriers that affect that person’s disability.”141 This restriction
134. Fischer, supra note 82, at 800 n.112.
135. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Essentially, the large cost of adopting the
statute’s required characteristic outweighs any monetary benefit to be gained from doing so.
136. Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009); see also supra notes
119-20 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
139. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1057 (finding that Gordon “endure[d] no real ISP-type harm”).
140. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
141. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 371.
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narrows both the definition of the injury and the definition of the
plaintiff. It shrinks the injury because plaintiffs with disabilities
can bring a suit for only those barriers that affect their disabili-
ties—not all barriers will suffice. And it reduces the pool of potential
plaintiffs by granting standing to only those people whose disabili-
ties are affected by particular barriers.
Standing restrictions in securities suits can be similarly catego-
rized. Historically, professional plaintiffs bringing lawsuits under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934142 frequently purchased a small
number of shares in hundreds of companies for the purpose of suing
when the stock price declined.143 In an attempt to remedy this
situation, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act.144 The Act institutes more restrictive standing requirements in
an effort to hobble certain types of professional plaintiffs.145 It sets
a ceiling on “the number of lawsuits in which an individual [can]
serve as class representative,” and forces plaintiffs to certify that
they have “reviewed the complaint” and “not purchased stock for the
purpose of participating in the litigation.”146 These limitations are
examples of restrictions that narrow the definition of the plaintiff by
prohibiting litigious plaintiffs who purchased stock with the intent
to sue from bringing an action.147 The Act also appoints as lead
plaintiff the person or entity with the “largest interest in the liti-
gation.”148 This provision further narrows the definition of the
plaintiff by permitting only the person or entity with the largest
interest in the outcome of the case to sue on behalf of the other
shareholders.149
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78oo (2006).
143. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
144. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2006)); see also Patricia J. Meyer, Note, What Congress Said About the Heightened Pleading
Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2517, 2518 (1998) (arguing that the PSLRA “represents Congress’ attempt to resolve the
conflict ... between the true fraud victim plaintiff and the professional plaintiff”).
145. See Fisch, supra note 32, at 536-37.
146. Id.
147. Part I argues that such intent-based factors are not proper standing requirements
because of the difficulty of determining the plaintiff’s state of mind and the fact that
litigiousness may actually benefit the legal system. See supra Part I.B.
148. Fisch, supra note 32, at 537.
149. See supra note 32.
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Because the provisions tightening standing requirements in
citizen suits can be classified into one or both of the categories that
make up the personalized injury requirement, a more general
solution exists to the difficulties that legislatures and courts
experience with respect to professional plaintiffs. Part IV proposes
a set of guidelines for legislatures to use in drafting standing
requirements that exclude professional plaintiffs who would not
further the goals of the statute.
IV. RECOMMENDATION: GUIDELINES FOR BETTER PERSONALIZED
INJURY STANDING REQUIREMENTS IN CITIZEN SUIT STATUTES 
A. Scope
So far, this Note has operated under the assumption that it is
always desirable to exclude professional plaintiffs from the justice
system. Although most statutes that modern professional plaintiffs
use contain some personalized injury requirement,150 the statutes’
broader purpose is to transform plaintiffs into private enforcers of
the law for the benefit of society.151 Several arguments have been
made in support of these “private Attorney[s] General,” including
that they reduce the need for public enforcement by decreasing
the pressure on “governmental regulatory resources,”152 “deterring
wrongful conduct,”153 and “providing relief for victims who may
have no other effective remedy.”154 One commentator has noted that,
“[h]ow much a particular type of private attorney general is thought
to be an agent for public ends, in addition to private ones, critically
affects the rules by which we should enable (and constrain) her and
the fees with which we should reward her.”155
At least one context exists in which Congress has found that the
public benefits of professional plaintiffs outweigh any corollary
150. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
151. See Bucy, supra note 8, at 8.
152. Id. at 4, 17. But see Coffee, supra note 8, at 229.
153. Bucy, supra note 8, at 17.
154. Id.
155. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters,
57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2173 (2004). 
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negative aspects: housing discrimination civil rights lawsuits.156
Judge Gould noted that the Fair Housing Act allows any person to
sue for violations, including plaintiffs who “manufacture” an injury
by walking into a house with the intent of being discriminated
against.157 He explained that having a monetary bounty to encour-
age people to report these violations might be helpful, even if money
is the only thing that motivates many of the plaintiffs to bring
suit.158
But Judge Gould also cautioned that courts “should not extend
the concept of ‘tester’ standing to an area where [courts] do not have
confidence that Congress intended to empower anyone to make
claims.”159 So in cases in which professional plaintiffs sue under a
statute not intended to protect them—or when the injuries they sue
upon are not true injuries for which the legislature intended
defendants to be liable—either courts or legislatures should step in
to reduce the pressure on court resources and the burden on
defendants. In addition, the Constitution may require Congress to
limit the people who may bring suit and the injuries upon which a
lawsuit may be based.160
B. Proper and Improper Bases for Citizen Suit Standing
Part I demonstrated the problems involved when courts use
after-the-fact guesswork to try to determine whether plaintiffs are
professional for the purpose of denying them statutory standing.
156. See Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (“There are a few areas in which our developing statutory law has embraced the
concept of permitting claims by those who insert themselves in the controversy for the express
purpose of creating a lawsuit. One of the best examples is that we accord standing to those
who ‘test’ for discrimination in housing by feigning interest in a housing site.”); see also Amy
F. Robertson, Standing To Sue Under Title III of the ADA, COLO. LAW., Mar. 27, 1998, at 55
(“[A] tester who intends to continue to patronize, or would like to patronize, a discriminatory
public accommodation but brings suit based on an encounter created in order to institute
litigation will satisfy the requirements of future harm and will have standing under Article
III.”).
157. See Gordon, 575 F.3d at 1069 (Gould, J., concurring).
158. See id. (“There may be good reasons for allowing this practice as a way to strengthen
the enforcement of housing discrimination laws, and Congress provided a broad standing
provision for private actors.”).
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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Inquiries involving plaintiffs’ litigiousness, motivation, and role in
bringing about their injury present many difficulties for courts.161
Litigiousness is not a proper basis because it can be hard to detect
and is not traditionally an appropriate inquiry in the absence of bad
faith.162 People who have been truly injured multiple times should
be able to sue all of the potential defendants for all of the injuries
they sustained.163 Litigiousness also may give plaintiffs experience,
benefiting the legal system by making the plaintiffs better enforcers
of the law.164
Motivation is difficult for courts to ascertain, which is why courts
have held that it is an improper basis for denying plaintiffs
standing.165 Examining plaintiffs’ role in bringing about the injury
often fails to distinguish plaintiffs who intend to sue for money from
those who intend to further the goals of the statute in cases that are
not as clear as Gordon.166 
The courts’ guesswork as to whether the legislature intended to
allow professional plaintiffs to sue, where to draw the line regarding
who constitutes a “professional plaintiff,” and what represents a
“true injury” suggests that it should be the legislature’s job to de-
termine what types of plaintiffs and injuries are permitted.167 Such
proscriptive lawmaking would avoid the large uncertainty and
burden on judicial resources that these inquiries place upon courts.
One judge in an ADA case has made this recommendation, stating
that “the system for adjudicating disputes under the ADA cries out
for a legislative solution. Only Congress can respond to vexatious
161. See supra Part I.B.
162. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. It could be argued that, if a professional
plaintiff can meet the statutory standing requirements, then the legislature intended that
plaintiff to sue to enforce the law. But the fact that legislatures have not corrected attempts
by courts to narrow the standing requirements in the ADA—and Congress’s passage of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act instituting new standing requirements—suggests
that this is not always the case.
167. See Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (Gould, J.,
concurring) (“We should not extend the concept of ‘tester’ standing to an area where we do not
have confidence that Congress intended to empower anyone to make claims.”).
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litigation tactics that otherwise comply with its statutory frame-
works.”168
Parts II and III demonstrated that the proper focus of efforts to
bar professional plaintiffs is the personalized injury requirement of
a citizen suit statute. But rather than focus on a plaintiff’s role in
bringing about the injury, legislatures should make this require-
ment more personalized by narrowing the definition of the plaintiff
or injury.169
C. Guidelines for Drafting Statutes and Their Application
When legislatures formulate standing restrictions to prevent the
average person from creating an injury or adopting the characteris-
tics of a plaintiff that the statute protects, they should adhere to a
few guidelines. For those restrictions that narrow the definition of
the plaintiff, legislatures should ensure that the required character-
istics of the plaintiff are (1) consistent with the goals of the statute,
(2) costly or undesirable for the average person to adopt, (3) easy
and noncontroversial for courts to determine, and (4) capable of
separating the professional plaintiff from the ordinary plaintiff.
Restrictions that narrow the definition of the injury should meet the
same factors, although the word “manufacture” should be substi-
tuted for the word “adopt” in factor (2).
If a legislature chooses, plaintiffs who are litigious or motivated
by money to create their own injuries would still be able to sue, but
these plaintiffs would be considered part of the class of people that
the statute is meant to protect, and their injuries would be injuries
that the statute is meant to deter.170 Also, because “manufacturing”
an injury would be costlier for the average person if the guidelines
are followed, there would be a significantly smaller chance that
plaintiffs who meet the statutory standing requirements would be
motivated solely by money rather than by furthering the goals of the
statute.171
168. Brother v. Tiger Partner, L.L.C., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
169. See supra Part III for examples.
170. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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1. Guidelines for Plaintiff Standing Requirements
The ADA serves as a useful vehicle for examining the effects of
these proposed guidelines. Factor (1) asks whether the proposed
language narrowing the definition of the plaintiff is consistent with
the goals of the citizen suit statute. This factor requires Congress to
articulate the purpose of the statute to determine the “class of
persons entitled to bring suit.”172 For example, as noted above, the
ADA has a provision narrowing the definition of the plaintiffs who
can sue to those individuals who have disabilities.173 One of the
purposes of the ADA is “to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.”174 So the requirement that a person
bringing a lawsuit have a disability would satisfy factor (1), because
although it may reduce the number of people bringing lawsuits
under the ADA, it limits the plaintiffs to individuals with disabili-
ties, which is the “class of individuals” the statute was meant to
protect.175
Factor (2) asks Congress to consider whether the proposed
characteristic intended to limit the pool of potential plaintiffs is
costly or undesirable for the average person to adopt. This factor
introduces a barrier that attempts to prevent the average person
from simply adopting the characteristics of a legitimate plaintiff in
order to bring a lawsuit.176 It also requires that the plaintiff have a
disability—a characteristic that would be both costly and undesir-
able for a person without a disability to bring about solely for the
purpose of initiating a lawsuit.177 Thus, the disability requirement,
so long as it is narrow, is likely to bar nearly all plaintiffs without
disabilities from circumventing the statute’s personalized injury
requirement, satisfying factor (2).
Factor (3) requires the characteristics used to limit the types of
plaintiffs who may sue to be easy and noncontroversial for courts
172. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992); see also supra note 128 and
accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
175. See id.
176. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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to determine. Past troubles with courts attempting to consider
the plaintiff’s role in bringing about the injury, litigiousness, or
motivation create the need to include this factor.178 The characteris-
tic should be noncontroversial—meaning that the lack of the
characteristic should be a proper basis for excluding plaintiffs. Nor
should courts have to conduct lengthy inquiries when determining
whether plaintiffs have the characteristic that the statute requires.
Assuming that the definition of “disabled” is clear enough, then the
requirement that the plaintiff have a disability satisfies factor (3).
It is noncontroversial that plaintiffs lacking a disability should not
be able to sue under a statute meant to protect people with disabili-
ties, and courts will be able to determine whether plaintiffs have a
disability more easily than courts are able to determine whether
plaintiffs have a certain subjective motivation.179
Finally, factor (4) seeks to ensure that the above guidelines have
resulted in a standing requirement that actually separates profes-
sional plaintiffs from ordinary plaintiffs. Congress should imagine
scenarios in which professional plaintiffs and their attorneys would
try to thwart the standing requirement, assuming that those who
would want to gain money by bringing a lawsuit would use all
available legal means to blend in with those plaintiffs that the
statute intends to protect. Professional plaintiffs who do not have a
disability would probably have a difficult time meeting the legal
disability requirement without rendering themselves disabled,
which seems too costly under factor (2). Thus, all of the factors
weigh in favor of the standing requirement.
2. Guidelines for Injury Standing Requirements
The fact that professional plaintiffs with a disability can still
bring lawsuits under the ADA suggests that additional personalized
injury standing requirements will be necessary if Congress believes
178. See supra Part I.B.
179. See 1 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2:2 (West
2008) (“The ADA definition is adequate because it provides disability categories rather than
listing all disabilities covered, the ADA regulations give specific examples of requisites of
those categories, and the regulations also list what is not considered a disability.”). The
disability inquiry is not always a simple one, but it will be easier for courts to consider in the
average case than the plaintiff’s motivation. See supra Part I.B.3.
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that not all people with a disability should be able to bring suit for
any violation. One solution is to narrow the definition of an injury
under the ADA. Restrictions that narrow the definition of the injury
should meet the same factors as those that narrow the definition of
the plaintiff, although the word “manufacture” should be substi-
tuted for the word “adopt” in factor (2).
For example, many courts have attempted to narrow the defini-
tion of an injury under the ADA by requiring that plaintiffs alleging
a violation demonstrate a “‘real and immediate threat’ of repeated
future harm.”180 Commentators have suggested that this require-
ment keeps professional plaintiffs from “claiming ADA violations in
many places of public accommodation at which it is highly unlikely
that such persons will visit in the future.”181 Applying the four
factors for injury standing limitations indicates that this court-
created standing requirement is improper.
Factor (1) asks whether the injury limitation is consistent with
the goals of the statute. At least one commentator has suggested
that requiring ADA plaintiffs to demonstrate the threat of harm is
not consistent with the goals of the statute.182 The commentator
argues that the ADA was not passed to protect only those plaintiffs
who frequent businesses but also those who just visit once.183 This
factor, therefore, weighs against finding a valid injury limitation. 
Under factor (2), assuming a professional plaintiff with a dis-
ability, the question would be whether requiring plaintiffs to make
multiple visits to the places they intend to sue would be too costly
or undesirable for plaintiffs who want to “manufacture” an injury to
bring suit. The burden on the professional plaintiff would depend on
how close the business was to the plaintiff’s house, as it would be
much easier for the plaintiff to visit a close restaurant multiple
180. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 373; see also supra note 131 and accom-
panying text.
181. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 373; see also supra note 132 and accom-
panying text.
182. Elizabeth Keadle Markey, The ADA’s Last Stand?: Standing and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185, 202 (2002).
183. See id. at 209 (“This requirement therefore weakens the ADA, allows unlawful
conduct, and frees defendants from accountability.”).
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times than a distant one.184 This factor weighs neither for nor
against the standing requirement. 
Applying factor (3), Congress must determine whether the
requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a “real and immediate
threat of repeated future harm”185 would be easy and noncontrover-
sial for courts applying the standing limitation to determine. One
factor that courts have considered when making the future harm
determination is whether the plaintiffs intend to return to the
business they are suing.186 But this intent inquiry sounds too much
like the subjective “motivation” determination made in some pro-
fessional plaintiff cases that has posed serious difficulties for courts
in the past.187 So factor (3) weighs against a finding of a valid injury
limitation. 
Finally, factor (4) asks if the injury limitation would allow courts
to distinguish professional plaintiffs from plaintiffs whom Congress
wants to permit to sue. Assuming a professional plaintiff with a
disability, it is unlikely that considering the number of times a
plaintiff has visited a particular business would distinguish legit-
imate plaintiffs from professional ones; a professional plaintiff
wanting to bring a lawsuit could simply visit the business fre-
quently to meet this requirement. Thus, because factors (1), (3), and
(4) weigh against the injury limitation that requires ADA plaintiffs
to demonstrate a threat of future harm by frequently visiting the
business they intend to sue, it should not be incorporated into the
statute.
An example of a provision that narrows the ADA’s definition of
injury and satisfies the four-part test is the requirement that a
plaintiff does not have standing if “the alleged barrier did not
discriminate against the plaintiff because his or her full and equal
184. See Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., No. SACV04046CJC(ANX), 2006 WL 2037942, at *10
(C.D. Cal. July 5, 2006) (“There simply are too many inconsistencies and inaccuracies for the
Court to conclude that Mr. Doran visited Del Taco restaurant # 415, which is located over 500
miles from his residence, before he filed his complaint.”).
185. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 373; see also supra note 131 and
accompanying text.
186. Markey, supra note 182, at 186 (describing a scenario in which a restaurant host
excludes a blind man from a restaurant because the man wants to bring his guide dog with
him).
187. See supra Part I.B.3.
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enjoyment of the facility was not impaired.”188 For example, two
scholars note that a minor technical violation, such as a parking
space for persons with disabilities that is an inch narrower than
accessibility guidelines require, does not impact a plaintiff’s enjoy-
ment of a facility.189 Preventing plaintiffs from suing business
owners for such minor deviations from nonstatutory guidelines
would reduce litigation by professional plaintiffs.190
This standing requirement satisfies all four factors of a valid
injury limitation. It is consistent with the goals of the ADA because
Congress intended that places of public accommodation provide
persons with disabilities “full and equal enjoyment” of the facilities
rather than facilities that fully comply with obscure technical regu-
lations.191 As further evidence that Congress directed the ADA at
correcting major violations rather than technical ones, the statute
includes language requiring that places of public accommodation
be made “readily accessible” only if they are new or modified,192
whereas existing facilities must make adjustments to enhance
accessibility only if the adjustments are “readily achievable.”193
Under factor (2), it would be more costly and undesirable for the
average person with a disability to manufacture an injury under
the “full enjoyment” standing requirement because professional
plaintiffs typically rely on highly technical violations, which are
numerous and easy to find, when suing a business under the
ADA.194 Requiring that the accessibility violations actually interfere
with the plaintiff’s use of the facility would reduce the number of
188. Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 374. The authors of that article argue for a
modification of the “full enjoyment” standard, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this
Note.
189. Id. at 374-75.
190. Id. at 375 (“A defendant has a legitimate concern that a ‘professional plaintiff’ might
measure the parking space and then bring a lawsuit against the restaurant, alleging that the
one-inch deviation from the Accessibility Standards was an architectural barrier.”).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”); see also Hymas &
Parkinson, supra note 125, at 375 (“It is important to note that full and equal enjoyment, and
not mere accessibility, is the desired goal of Title III of the ADA.”).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1); see also Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 361.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); see also Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 361.
194. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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violations that can serve as a valid injury, forcing professional
plaintiffs to search harder for major violations that could grant
them standing. If courts interpreted the “full enjoyment” standard
to mean that a plaintiff may sue a business for only those violations
that relate to the plaintiff’s disability, then it would further narrow
the barriers that any particular plaintiff could use as a basis for a
lawsuit.195
Analysis under factor (3) indicates that whether an alleged
barrier impacts the plaintiff’s “full enjoyment” of the facility is
easier and less controversial to determine than, for example, the
plaintiff’s motivation in bringing a lawsuit.196 Courts in some
jurisdictions already compare an individual’s disability with the
“architectural barrier” the person allegedly faces, and further
require the barrier to be “related” to the person’s disability.197 For
highly technical violations, such as the parking spot that is one
inch too narrow,198 it will be easy for judges to determine that the
violation has no effect on a plaintiff’s use of the facility. For vio-
lations that are more serious, there may be disagreement over
whether the violation interferes with a plaintiff’s “full enjoyment.”199
But courts will spend less time deciding whether an alleged non-
technical barrier constitutes a violation than they would spend
deciding whether every plaintiff who brings an ADA claim—whether
technical or not—is financially motivated. Finally, under factor (4),
even if the standing requirement permits professional plaintiffs
with disabilities to sue for violations that interfere with their “full
enjoyment” of a facility, these lawsuits are preferable to claims
based on highly technical violations that cost businesses and the
justice system time and resources while doing nothing to increase
accessibility.200
195. Many courts already impose this requirement. See Hymas & Parkinson, supra note
125, at 372.
196. See supra Part I.B.3.
197. See Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 372.
198. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
199. See Hyman & Parkinson, supra note 125, at 365 (“A case-by-case determination of an
architectural barrier is certain to provide inconsistent rulings among the courts.”).
200. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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D. Concerns with Overreaching
Narrowing statutory standing requirements responds to the
problem that overly permissive standing requirements open the
floodgates for professional plaintiffs to sue.201 But if stricter
standing requirements become too selective, they risk closing the
courthouse door to plaintiffs with legitimate grievances.202 The
legislature should ensure that any standing restriction achieves the
proper balance between excluding undesirable plaintiffs and
permitting those who have suffered what the legislature considers
to be actionable injuries to sue. The factors above are intended to
determine whether the standing requirements are adequate proxies
for excluding certain plaintiffs and injuries from the protection of
the statute. As they are only proxies, they are not perfect indicators
of whether Congress meant to protect the plaintiff or injury.
However, the factors are better indicators than the characteristics
that courts have previously considered203—even if they seem less
directly related to whether the plaintiff is a professional.
CONCLUSION
Two narratives describe the role of professional plaintiffs in
society. To some, they are the “private attorneys general”204 who
muster their experience to launch a barrage of litigation and collect
their rightful tribute from the unrepentant hordes—violators of
scores of statutory commands. To others, they are “viperous ver-
min”205 who scuttle from the darkness to gorge themselves on meaty
prizes bestowed by unwary legislators.
201. For a brief history of how the permissive standing requirements of a California law
allowed professional plaintiffs to flourish, see Gavin L. Charlston, Note, When Silence Means
Everything: The Application of Proposition 64 to Pending Actions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 625-
29 (2007).
202. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. This risk is an additional reason why it is
improper to consider motivation, litigiousness, or the plaintiff’s role in bringing about the
injury. These restrictions make the standing requirements too narrow, and frequently exclude
legitimate plaintiffs by failing to separate professional plaintiffs from ordinary plaintiffs. See
supra Part I.B.
203. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
204. Bucy, supra note 8, at 63; see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
205. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 80, at 139; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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This Note has not attempted to elevate one narrative over
another—indeed, both contain some truth. Instead, this Note has
considered the question of whether plaintiffs should have standing
to sue when they have brought an injury upon themselves for the
purpose of collecting a damage award under a citizen suit statute.
History has shown that statutes giving citizens the right to enforce
the law in the absence of a personalized injury to the plaintiff fell
into disfavor because they were often abused.206 To remedy this
situation, legislatures and courts require that plaintiffs have suf-
fered a personalized injury different from that suffered by society
as a whole.207 But the definitions of the plaintiffs who can sue and
the injuries that can serve as the basis for a cause of action are
often broad enough under private enforcement statutes’ standing
requirements that professional plaintiffs can easily “manufacture”
injuries or adopt the characteristics of the plaintiffs that the statute
protects, rendering the personalized injury requirement meaning-
less.208
If legislatures wish to avoid this outcome, they must stay vigilant
and remember professional plaintiffs when drafting private enforce-
ment statutes. This Note has provided guidelines for legislatures to
use when determining whether a proposed personalized injury
standing requirement involving a limitation of the plaintiff or the
injury will properly deny standing to litigants who do not further
the goals of the statute.209
Legislatures should draft standing requirements with some
concrete characteristic of the plaintiff or injury that indicates
whether the plaintiff or injury is one that the statute probably
meant to protect.210 Using such proxies will save time while
ensuring that the statute protects a narrow class of individuals,
although legislatures must be careful not to prohibit too many
legitimate claims from being pursued.211 Legislators should refrain
from using factors that are unpredictable and waste judicial
206. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part II.B.
208. See supra Part II.C.
209. See supra Part IV.
210. See supra Part IV.C.
211. See supra Part IV.D.
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resources, such as the plaintiff’s motivation, litigiousness, or role in
bringing about the injury.212
How well legislators articulate the role that professional plaintiffs
should play in enforcing certain statutes ultimately will determine
whether society accepts the plaintiffs. It is a difficult task that calls
upon legislators to harness the volatile forces of human greed to
serve the ends of justice.
Brandon Murrill*
212. See supra Part I.B.
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